I consider a retailer who sells a new product over two periods: advance and regular selling seasons. Experienced consumers learn their valuations for the product in the advance selling season, while inexperienced consumers learn only when the product becomes available in the regular selling season. The retailer is uncertain about the number of inexperienced consumers. Production takes place between the periods. Unsold units are scrapped at a price that is below the retailer's marginal cost, which makes it costly to produce and not sell. I show that when consumers are less heterogeneous in their valuations, the retailer should implement advance selling and offer a pre-order price guarantee. For some parameter configurations a pre-order price guarantee acts as a commitment device not to decrease the price in the regular selling season. In other situations, it enables the seller to react to the information that is obtained from pre-orders by increasing or decreasing the price. When consumers are more heterogeneous in their valuations, the market size uncertainty is small, or the scrap value is high, the retailer should not implement advance selling.
Introduction
In modern markets, sales of a product may precede the date when the product becomes available for consumption. Advance selling is a marketing strategy by a firm that allows consumers to submit pre-orders for a new to-be-released product. Advance selling reduces uncertainty for both the firm and consumers. It helps the firm partially to resolve uncertainty about the future demand for its product, thus allowing for better production and distribution capacity planning.
By placing an advance order consumers avoid the risk of facing a stock-out. 1 At the same time, consumers may be uncertain about their valuations of the new product, which permits a greater extraction of consumer surplus by the firm in the advance selling season.
A pricing phenomenon that is often observed along with advance selling is a pre-order price guarantee. Many retailers -such as Amazon.com, GameStop, or Best Buy -guarantee that the ultimate price that the customer pays is the lowest price between the pre-order price and the price on the release day. For example, the Amazon.com pre-order price guarantee policy 2 states: "Order now and if the Amazon.com price decreases between your order time and the end of the day of the release date, you'll receive the lowest price." This promotional offer eliminates another uncertainty that consumers face: the level of future price. The game starts with the retailer's announcement of the advance selling price, which he may couple with the price guarantee policy. After observing the number of pre-orders, the retailer decides how much to produce for the regular selling season. If the price guarantee policy was announced and the regular selling price is below the advance selling price, the retailer refunds the price difference for the pre-orders. Unsold units are scrapped at a price below the retailer's marginal cost, which makes it costly to produce and not sell. 1 The most extreme example of such a stock-out was release of iPhone 5 by Apple in September 2013. The company ran out of the launch stock within hours after the product had become available for pre-orders on September 14 at 12am PDT. There were no phones available in stores at all on the release date of September 21. The customers who pre-ordered iPhone 5 "too late" had to wait several weeks for delivery.
2 See http://www.amazon.com/gp/promotions/details/popup/AWT354OR7BM1U downloaded on April 21, 2015. 3 An example of a sharp drop in price is again provided by Apple's iPhone. Soon after the first version of the device was introduced in June 2007, the price dropped from $600 to $400, causing discontent among the user base. The intervention of Apple's CEO Steve Jobs led to issuance of $100 rebates to the customers who acquired the phones at the higher price.
I show that when consumers are less heterogeneous in their valuations for the product, the retailer should implement advance selling and offer a pre-order price guarantee. For some parameter configurations the price guarantee policy acts as a commitment device not to decrease the price in the regular selling season. In other situations, it enables the retailer to react to the information obtained from pre-orders. If the number of pre-orders is small, the retailer sets a low price in the regular selling season, which targets the low-valuation customers who remain in the market; and he refunds the price difference for the pre-orders. He sets a high price if the number of pre-orders is large, so no consumer purchases the product in the regular selling season.
When consumers are more heterogeneous in their valuations, the retailer may not want to implement advance selling. I show that if the market size uncertainty is small, or the scrap value is high, spot selling at a high price becomes the retailer's optimal pricing strategy.
In the basic model I assume that the retailer cannot credibly commit to the regular selling price in the advance selling season. The question, then, arises: If the retailer can commit to a price schedule at the beginning of the game, will he do so in equilibrium? In contrast to the Coase conjecture, 4 I find that the retailer is (weakly) better off if he offers a pre-order price guarantee than if he commits to a price schedule. The intuition behind this result is that a price commitment does not have the flexibility of a pre-order price guarantee. Because in my model learning by the retailer occurs between the advance and regular selling seasons, it becomes valuable for him to be able to react to the new information by either increasing or decreasing the price.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A literature review appears in Section 2. The model is introduced in Section 3. I derive the retailer's optimal pricing strategy in Section 4. In Section 5, I consider the situation in which the retailer can credibly commit to the regular selling price in advance. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
Existing Literature
In my model I treat consumers as strategic. Strategic consumers compare the options of preordering the product and waiting until the regular selling season. This modeling approach has been adopted by a number of theoretical studies of advance selling. 5 4 Developed in Coase (1972) , the conjecture proposes that a monopolistic retailer who does not observe individual valuations and tries to separate consumers by offering different prices in different periods, will have to sell his product at a low price. The monopolist could get a higher profit by committing to a price schedule at the beginning of the game. See also Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) . 5 Other papers on advance selling -including Tang, Rajaram, Alptekinoglu, and Ou (2004) , McCardle, Rajaram, and Tang (2004) , Chen and Parlar (2005) , and Boyaci andÖzer (2010) -model consumers as non-strategic. These Li and Zhang (2013) investigate whether the seller should allow consumers to pre-order the product and whether this option should be coupled with the price guarantee policy. The assumptions that the authors make about consumer valuations are quite different from the present paper.
Specifically, Li and Zhang (2013) assume that there is sufficient information for consumers to evaluate the product before its release and that consumers with high valuations arrive in the advance selling season, while those with low valuations in the regular selling season. Under these assumptions the advance selling price is always higher than the regular selling price. In contrast, in the present paper both advance selling discounts and premiums can arise in equilibrium.
Another closely related paper is Zhao and Pang (2011) . The authors divide consumers into two groups: The informed group arrives in the advance selling season, while the uninformed group in the regular selling season. The authors show that a price commitment weakly dominates dynamic pricing. A pre-order price guarantee is the seller's best strategy when consumer valuation uncertainty is high and there exists uncertainty about the number of informed consumers. These results are quite different from the present paper, partly because Zhao and Pang (2011) restrict their attention to the first-period prices that induce informed consumers to preorder the product. In the present paper I show that selling the product only in the regular selling season may be optimal. Xie and Shugan (2001) examine the impact of marginal costs and capacity constraints on advance-selling pricing strategies. Like a pre-order price guarantee, capacity constraints help the seller credibly to convince consumers that the regular selling price will be high. Möller and Watanabe (2010) consider advance purchase discounts and clearance sales (revenues have to be positive in both periods). They determine how the comparison of these two pricing strategies depends on price commitment, the availability of temporal capacity limits, the rationing rule, and resale. In both papers the aggregate demand is certain, in contrast to the present model. Nocke, Peitz, and Rosar (2011) assume that the seller can credibly commit to future prices, consumers are heterogeneous in their expected valuations, and there is no aggregate demand uncertainty. The seller chooses among advance selling (all sales occur at the early date), spot selling (all sales occur at the later date), and advance-purchase discounts (some sales occur at the early date and some at the later date). Under advance-purchase discounts, consumers with high expected valuations purchase the product in advance, while those with low expected valuations delay their purchasing decisions and buy at the regular price if their realized valuations turn out to be high. The authors provide precise conditions under which advance-purchase discounts implement the seller's optimal mechanism.
In their model of advance selling, Chu and Zhang (2011) emphasize the evolution of conpapers assume that the number of consumers who pre-order the product is an exogenously given increasing function of the advance selling discount. sumer valuations and the seller's control over it. The authors assume that the seller operates under price commitment, consumers are uncertain about their valuations, and there is no aggregate demand uncertainty.
Like most papers on advance selling with strategic consumers, Prasad, Stecke, and Zhao (2011) assume that consumers are uncertain about their valuations in advance. Correlated numbers of consumers arrive in the advance and regular selling seasons. In contrast to the above papers and the present paper, the regular selling price in Prasad, Stecke, and Zhao (2011) is fixed exogenously. Restricting their attention to advance selling discounts, the authors derive the seller's profit-maximizing strategy and find that implementing advance selling is not always optimal. Zhao and Pang (2011) introduce consumer loss aversion. As in Prasad, Stecke, and Zhao (2011) , the regular selling price is fixed and only advance selling discounts are considered.
Model Setup
Consider a retailer who sells a product over two periods. The product is released in period 2 (the regular selling season), but the retailer can take pre-orders in period 1 (the advance selling season). Infinitesimal consumers with unit demands are heterogeneous in two dimensions: First, they differ in their willingness to pay for the product. Specifically, I assume that consumer valuations are i.i.d. random variables distributed according to a two-point distribution:
denote the mean of this distribution.
Second, consumers can be experienced or inexperienced. Experienced consumers learn their valuations for the product in period 1. The mass (number) of these consumers is n e . 6
Inexperienced consumers learn their valuations only when the product becomes available in period 2. The number of inexperienced consumers, N i , is unknown to the retailer. Specifically, I assume that N i is a normally distributed random variable with the mean n i and the variance σ 2 i :
This specific functional form simplifies consecutive derivations in the paper. In particular, 6 Experienced consumers can be taken as those who have purchased previous versions of the product in the past, so it is reasonable to assume that they know their valuations for the new version of the product, and that the number of experienced consumers is known to the retailer from the outset. it allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the Newsvendor problem (which has been extensively studied in the operations management literature) that the retailer faces when he chooses how much to produce for the regular selling season. 7 Let F (·) denote the cumulative distribution function of N n i , σ 2 i and Φ(·) the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Hence,
For technical convenience, I will further assume that the probability of a negative number of inexperienced consumers is negligible,
That is, the ratio n i /σ i is sufficiently large. 8
The retailer decides how much to produce after observing the number of pre-orders, D 1 , at the end of period 1. He cannot replenish inventory during the regular selling season. Thus, the retailer's quantity choice is Q = D 1 + q, where D 1 units of the product fulfill the pre-orders and q units are produced for the (stochastic) second-period demand, denoted by D 2 . The constant unit cost of production is c. I assume c < v L . Unsold units have a scrap value s that is smaller than c, which makes it costly to produce and not sell.
Let p 1 and p 2 denote the prices in the advance and regular selling seasons, respectively. If the retailer offers a pre-order price guarantee, he must refund the price difference for the preorders when p 2 < p 1 . I assume that there are no hassle costs that are associated with processing price refunds. I will use the notation "PG" for the price guarantee policy and "NPG" to indicate the absence of such a policy. Table 1 lists the notation that was introduced above and also some of the notation that will be introduced later. Figure At the beginning of period 2 all inexperienced consumers learn their valuations. The retailer announces the regular selling price p 2 . Under the PG policy, if p 2 < p 1 all pre-orders automatically receive internal price matching. Those consumers who did not pre-order the product 7 The use of the normal distribution can also be justified by the following argument: If there is a large finite number of consumers n and the probability that a single consumer is interested in the product is p, then the number of such interested consumers is a binomial random variable with the mean np and the variance np(1 − p). The distribution of this discrete random variable is approximated by the normal distribution with the same mean and variance when min{np, n(1 − p)} is sufficiently large.
8 This technical assumption is standard in the literature. See, for example, Li and Zhang (2013) , who also use the normal distribution to model demand uncertainty and, therefore, have to "ignore" the negative realizations of the demand. 
Decision variablesuantity produced for the regular selling season Q total quantity produced (including pre-orders)
prices in the advance and regular selling seasons
Other notation D 1 , D 2 demands in the advance and regular selling seasons η stock-out probability α
retailer's expected profit from the regular selling season Π retailer's total expected profit (including pre-orders) decide whether to purchase it at price p 2 . The product is delivered at the end of period 2. Unsold units are scrapped.
All consumers are assumed to be strategic in my model. They compare the options of ordering in advance and of waiting until the regular selling season. If a consumer waits until period 2, he/she faces the risk that the product will be out of stock. If the realization of D 2 is less than q, all consumers will obtain the product. Otherwise, the probability that any consumer who wants to purchase the product in the regular selling season but is unable to get it is the • all experienced consumers learn their valuations
• the retailer announces PG/NPG policy and p 1 • some consumers pre-order at price p 1
• the retailer observes pre-orders D 1 and updates his forecast of second-period demand D 2 • the retailer produces Q = D 1 + q
• all inexperienced consumers learn their valuations
• the retailer announces p 2 and under PG refunds the price difference for pre-orders if p 2 < p 1 • some consumers purchase at price p 2
• product delivery takes place • unsold units are scrapped Figure 1 : Timeline of the model fraction of excess demand. That is, if we let η denote the stock-out probability, 9 then
where
In the equilibrium analysis that follows I assume, without loss of generality, that whenever a consumer is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing the product, he/she purchases the product, and whenever a consumer is indifferent between pre-ordering the product or waiting until period 2, he/she pre-orders the product.
Equilibrium Analysis
I start the equilibrium analysis with the NPG policy (Section 4.1). The results are summarized in Lemma 2 that lists three "candidate" (potentially optimal) pricing strategies for the retailer.
Each of these strategies can be profit-maximizing under the NPG policy for some parameter configurations. Then I consider the PG policy (Section 4.2). Lemma 3 is Lemma 2's counterpart.
I complete the equilibrium analysis by determining the retailer's optimal pricing strategy in Proposition 1 (Section 4.3).
When a Pre-order Price Guarantee is not Offered
Suppose the retailer does not offer consumers a pre-order price guarantee. Only two prices can be optimal in period 2: v L and v H . Indeed, if the retailer chooses p 2 ∈ (v L , v H ), he reduces the price margin but attracts the same number of consumers as at p 2 = v H .
In period 1 there are three types of consumers: experienced consumers with high valuations; experienced consumers with low valuations; and inexperienced consumers. Below I show that experienced consumers with high valuations have the greatest incentive to pre-order the product and experienced consumers with low valuations have the least incentive.
When a consumer decides whether to pre-order the product or wait until period 2, he/she considers the pre-order price p 1 , the probability α that the retailer sets the second-period price to v L , and the probability η that the product will be out of stock. Specifically, experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product if and only if their payoff from doing so is no lower than their expected payoff from waiting until the regular selling season:
Experienced consumers with v = v L pre-order the product if and only if
Finally, inexperienced consumers pre-order the product if and only if
It is straightforward to show that for any p 1 , α ∈ [0, 1] and η ∈ [0, 1]
Therefore, we have the following result:
Lemma 1 (Consumer incentives to pre-order the product). Experienced consumers with high valuations have the most incentives to pre-order the product, followed by inexperienced consumers, followed by experienced consumers with low valuations.
Lemma 1 immediately implies four purchasing patterns that are consistent with equilibrium behavior: (A) all consumers pre-order the product; (B) all inexperienced consumers and experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product; (C) only experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product; and (D) all consumers wait until period 2. It is worth noting that patterns A and B allow the retailer to resolve uncertainty about the number of inexperienced consumers. Case D is payoff-equivalent to selling the product only in period 2 (spot selling).
The rest of Section 4.1 is organized as follows: First, in each of the cases A-D I find the retailer's "best" pricing strategy. Some of these strategies yield the same expected payoff to the retailer (e.g., the strategy obtained in case A and the strategy obtained in case B). I summarize the results of this case-by-case analysis in Lemma 2.
Cases A and B: Deterministic Second-Period Demand
In case A: No consumer waits until period 2, so the retailer produces Q = D 1 . The prices p 1 = v L and p 2 = v H induce all consumers to pre-order the product. The retailer's expected
Now consider case B: Since only experienced consumers with v = v L wait until period 2, the retailer optimally sets p 2 = v L . The second-period demand D 2 = (1−θ)n e is deterministic.
The retailer produces Q = D 1 + (1 − θ)n e to fulfill the pre-orders and satisfy the second-period demand. The stock-out probability equals zero, as q = D 2 . The highest p 1 that leads to the purchasing behavior in case B isp 1 . Substituting α = 1 and η = 0 into (4) yieldŝ
The retailer's expected profit is, therefore,
It is the same as in case A.
Case C: The Newsvendor Problem
Next, consider case C: The pool of consumers who wait until period 2 consists of experienced consumers with v = v L and inexperienced consumers. Everyone will purchase the product if the retailer sets its second-period price to v L , so
inexperienced consumers with high valuations will purchase the product, hence D 2 = θN i .
Under both prices the second-period demand is stochastic.
Suppose that the retailer produces q units of the product for the regular selling season. Then min{q, D 2 } units will be sold and (q − D 2 ) + units will be scrapped. The retailer's expected profit from period 2, denoted by π, is
The problem of maximizing (5) is known as the Newsvendor problem by analogy with the situation that is faced by the owner of a newsstand. Early each morning, before observing the demand, the owner has to decide how many copies of the day's newspaper to order. If he orders too much, some copies will have to be thrown away or sold as scrap paper at the end of the day. If he orders too little, some customers will be disappointed, and sales will be lost. The
Newsvendor problem is, therefore, the problem of finding the optimal size of a single order that must be placed, given the demand distribution and cost parameters.
Since min{q,
This is intuitive. If in period 2 more is demanded than was produced, that is, D 2 > q, the retailer forgoes (p 2 − c)(D 2 − q) of the profit. If less is demanded than was produced (D 2 < q), the retailer loses (c − s)(q − D 2 ) in scrapping unsold units.
It is convenient to think of p 2 − c as the per-unit production-shortfall cost and of c − s as the per-unit surplus-production cost. The problem of maximizing π(q) is equivalent to the problem of minimizing the expected shortfall and surplus cost G(q). As shown in Silver, Pyke, and Peterson (1998) , the first-order condition is
If we write β as (p 2 − c)/[(p 2 − c) + (c − s)], it becomes obvious that q * increases in p 2 − c and decreases in c − s. That is, high levels of the per-unit shortfall cost prompt the retailer to produce more for stochastic second-period demand; high levels of the per-unit surplus cost lead to less production.
Suppose that the retailer charges p 2 = v L : The second-period demand equals (1−θ)n e +N i ;
hence the demand is normally distributed with the mean (1 − θ)n e + n i and the variance σ 2 i . From the first-order condition (6) we obtain
and z β L is the β L -th percentile of the standard normal distribution, 
where φ is the density function of the standard normal distribution. The negative term is the (minimized) expected shortfall and surplus cost.
Next, suppose that the retailer charges p 2 = v H : The second-period demand D 2 = θN i is normally distributed with the mean θn i and the variance θ 2 σ 2 i . Thus, we have
See the Appendix for the derivations of (7), (8), (9), and (10). 11
Comparing (8) and (10), we conclude that the retailer will set p 2 to v L and produce q * (v L )
to satisfy the second-period demand if θ <θ, where
If θ >θ, the retailer will set p 2 to v H and produce q * (v H ) to satisfy the second-period demand.
Consider θ <θ. The stock-out probability equals
In the Appendix I show that η * (v L ) increases in σ i and decreases in β L . These properties are intuitive. If σ i = 0, the second-period demand is deterministic and the retailer produces just enough units of the product for period 2, so the stock-out probability is zero. As the market size uncertainty σ i increases, η * (v L ) increases. Next, consider β L . The stock-out probability decreases in β L because high values of β L are associated with high levels of the per-unit shortfall cost and low levels of the per-unit surplus cost, which prompts the retailer to produce more for period 2.
By (2), the highest p 1 that leads to the purchasing behavior in case C iŝ
The retailer's total expected profit is, therefore,
The second term is the price premium that experienced consumers with v = v H are willing to pay to avoid the risk of facing a stock-out.
11 Here, the technical assumption
Now suppose θ >θ. Since p 2 = v H , α = 0, so the highest p 1 that leads to case C iŝ
The retailer's total expected profit is
Case D: Spot Selling
Finally, we consider case D, in which all consumers wait until the regular selling season. Any p 1 > v H will lead to this purchasing behavior. Case D is payoff-equivalent to spot selling (SS):
The retailer sells the product in period 2 only.
If the retailer charges p 2 = v L , then D 2 = n e + N i . The mean of D 2 is n e + n i and the variance is σ 2 i . Hence, the retailer should produce Q = n e + n i + σ i z β L . His expected profit is
It is lower than in case A.
If the retailer charges p 2 = v H , then D 2 = θ (n e + N i ). The mean of D 2 is θ(n e + n i ) and the variance is θ 2 σ 2 i , so the retailer's optimal production quantity is Q = θ(n e + n i ) + θσ i z β H . His expected profit is
It is the same as in case C, θ >θ.
The above analysis of cases A through D serves as a proof for the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Pricing strategies under the NPG policy). Under the NPG policy the retailer will choose one from the following list of pricing strategies:
(NPG1) Set p 1 = v L and p 2 = v H . All consumers pre-order the product. The retailer's expected profit is Π = (v L − c)(n e + n i ).
(NPG2) This pricing strategy can be implemented by the retailer when θ <θ.
Experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product, while the rest of consumers purchase the product in period 2 (provided it is in stock). The retailer's expected profit is
(SS) Sell the product only in period 2. Set p 2 = v H . Consumers with v = v H purchase the product (provided it is in stock). The retailer's expected profit is
Under strategy NPG1 all consumers pre-order the product, as it is offered at a substantial
In contrast, strategy NPG2 corresponds to advance selling at a premium, which experienced consumers with high valuations are willing to pay, so as to avoid the risk of facing a stock-out. (Note that NPG2 is available to the retailer only when θ <θ.) Under strategy SS the retailer sells the product at a high price in the regular selling season.
It is clear that strategy NPG1 maximizes the seller's expected payoff when θ is close to zero.
This strategy not only allows the retailer to extract almost all of the consumer surplus, but also to avoid the newsvendor's costs of producing too much or too little.
When θ is large, strategy NPG2 drops from the retailer's list of potentially optimal pricing strategies, as it simply cannot be implemented. Comparing strategies NPG1 and SS, we see that the negative term in the retailer's expected profit under strategy SS -the (minimized) expected shortfall and surplus cost -undermines the attractiveness of charging a high price. This cost decreases as the demand uncertainty (σ i ) decreases and the scrap value (s) increases. 12 When θ is in the upper range of the interval θ <θ, strategy NPG2 may become the profitmaximizing strategy. The effects of σ i and s on the retailer's expected profit under this strategy are, however, ambiguous. While low values of σ i and high values of s decrease the expected shortfall and surplus cost, they also decrease the stock-out probability η * (v L ) and hence decrease the price that is premium paid by experienced consumers with v = v H .
When the Price Guarantee Policy is Announced
The PG policy differs from the NPG policy in cases B and C, where sales are positive in both periods. I analyze these two cases below.
Case B
Recall that in case B all inexperienced consumers and experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product, while experienced consumers with v = v L wait until period 2. Under the PG policy, inexperienced consumers are willing to pay up tov in period 1, as they get a refund whenever p 2 = v L . Experienced consumers with v = v H are willing to pay up to v H in period 1. Therefore, the highest p 1 that leads to the purchasing behavior in case B is p 1 =v.
At the end of period 1 the retailer observes D 1 = θn e + N i and hence learns N i . Suppose that the retailer charges p 2 = v L : Since in this case D 2 = (1 − θ)n e , the retailer produces Q = D 1 + (1 − θ)n e and refunds the price difference for the pre-orders. His profit is, therefore,
Charging p 2 = v H saves the retailer the refund amount of (v − v L ) (θn e + N i ), but leads to no sales in period 2. His profit is
It is straightforward to show (see the Appendix
and
Therefore, when θ <θ the retailer conditions his second-period price on the realization of N i , which he learns from the first-period demand D 1 . Specifically, the retailer charges p 2 = v L and refunds the price difference if N i < N i . Otherwise, he charges p 2 = v H . His expected profit is
When θ >θ, the retailer charges p 2 = v H , and his expected profit is
Case C
In case C only experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product. Under the PG policy they are willing to pay up to v H in period 1, as they will get a refund whenever p 2 = v L . Hence, the retailer charges
Since the price drops, the retailer refunds the price difference for the pre-orders. His expected profit is
It is the same as spot selling at p 2 = v H (case D).
Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Pricing strategies under the PG policy). Under the PG policy the retailer will choose one from the following list of pricing strategies:
(PG1) This pricing strategy can be implemented by the retailer when θ <θ. Set p 1 =v and announce the PG policy. All inexperienced consumers and experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product. After observing D 1 (hence, N i ), set p 2 = v L and refund the price difference if N i < N i (experienced consumers with v = v L purchase the product in period 2); set p 2 = v H if otherwise (no consumer purchases the product in period 2).
The retailer's expected profit is
(PG2) This pricing strategy can be implemented by the retailer when θ >θ. Set p 1 =v and announce the PG policy. All inexperienced consumers and experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product. Set p 2 = v H . No consumer purchases the product in period 2. The retailer's expected profit is
Sometimes it will be convenient to merge strategies PG1 and PG2 into one strategy, as follows: The retailer announces the PG policy and sets the price tov. Since all inexperienced consumers and experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product, the retailer learns N i . He charges p 2 = v L and refunds the price difference if
Otherwise, he sets p 2 = v H . The resulting expected profit equals
Obviously, strategy NPG1 is inferior to strategy PG1/PG2, as the latter allows the retailer to learn N i and use this knowledge when choosing between two options. The first is to decrease the price in the regular selling season to p 2 = v L . All consumers end up paying v L for the product. This option is payoff-equivalent to strategy NPG1. The second option is to set p 2 = v H .
Inexperienced consumers and experienced consumers with v = v H payv, while experienced consumers with v = v L do not purchase the product. This option results in a higher expected payoff than the first one when either: (a) θ >θ; or (b) θ <θ and N i > N i .
Optimal Pricing Strategy
In this section we complete the equilibrium analysis by determining which of the pricing strategies -NPG2, PG1/PG2, or SS -maximizes the retailer' expected profit. Proposition 1 shows that strategy PG1/PG2 works very well when θ is either close to zero (most consumers have low valuations) or to one (most consumers have high valuations). When θ is intermediate, spot
selling at a high price may become optimal.
Proposition 1 (Optimal pricing strategy) . The retailer's optimal pricing strategy is strategy PG1/PG2 for extreme values of θ, yielding the retailer the expected profit of
For intermediate values of θ, strategy SS delivers the maximum expected profit of
The region over which strategy SS is optimal expands as the ratio of experienced to inexperienced consumers, n e /n i , increases, σ i decreases, or s increases.
Corollary 1. The retailer is weakly better off by announcing the price guarantee policy:
PG policy NPG policy.
The proof of Proposition 1 is relegated to the Appendix. Strategy NPG2 can never be optimal, for the following reasons. The advantage of NPG2 is price discrimination: Inexperienced consumers and experienced consumers with v = v L pay p 2 = v L , while experienced consumers with v = v H pre-order the product at a higher price,
The drawback is that the Newsvendor problem is real here, because the retailer does not learn N i . Specifically, the retailer loses
to the stochastic second-period demand. As was mentioned earlier (see the discussion after
Lemma 2), the changes in the parameters that soften the Newsvendor problem also decrease the stock-out probability, thus reducing the benefits of price discrimination.
The result that strategy NPG2 can never arise in equilibrium relies on the assumption N i ∼ N n i , σ 2 i and the definition of the stock-out probability (1). If consumers were more pessimistic about their chances of getting the product in the regular selling season, then the stockout probability would be higher, which would increase the profitability of strategy NPG2.
Suppose, for example, that each consumer believes that all consumers who remain in the market in period 2 will get the product before him/her: This changes the definition of the stockout probability to η = Prob (D 2 > q) .
By the first-order condition (6), the new η * (v L ) equals 1 − β L . Now, a decrease in σ i reduces (14), but does not affect η * (v L ). It is easy to show that for some parameter configurations strategy NPG2 dominates both PG1/PG2 and SS. Thus, Corollary 1 has limited applicability.
Price Commitment
The goal of this section is to test the Coase conjecture (summarized in footnote 4). Specifically, we consider a setting in which we assume that the retailer is able to commit to a price schedule p 1 , p 2 in advance. 13 The main question is: Will the retailer choose to commit to a price schedule in equilibrium?
The price commitment setting (PC) differs from the NPG policy in cases B and C. In case B the retailer can get
by committing to the price schedule
If the retailer sets p 2 to v H , then the highest p 1 that leads to the purchasing behavior in case B iŝ
Thus, the price schedule p 1 =v, p 2 = v H yields the expected profit of
Note that this payoff was not possible under the NPG policy.
Now consider case C. The difference between the PC setting and the NPG policy is that both expected profits
13 Several theoretical papers on advance selling that were discussed in Section 2 (Zhao and Stecke, 2010; Nocke, Peitz, and Rosar, 2011; Prasad, Stecke, and Zhao, 2011; Chu and Zhang, 2011) assume that the seller announces both p1 and p2 in the advance selling season. and
can be obtained by the retailer (i.e., there are no restrictions on θ). We conclude that the retailer is (weakly) better off committing to a price schedule p 1 , p 2 than not:
thus confirming the Coase conjecture.
Let us now compare the payoffs that can be obtained in the price commitment setting with those under a pre-order price guarantee. First, observe that committing to the price schedule p 1 =v, p 2 = v H with the expected profit (15) is payoff-equivalent to strategy PG2. We arrive at an important result: In some situations, the price guarantee policy acts as a commitment device not to decrease the price in the regular selling season.
Second, it can be shown that removing the constraint θ <θ from strategy NPG2 does not change the results of Proposition 1 (NPG2 still cannot be profit-maximizing). Hence, the retailer is better off announcing the price guarantee policy than committing to a price schedule:
PG policy PC setting.
The strict inequality obtains when PG1 is the optimal pricing strategy, that is, for small values of θ. Recall that PG1 involves p 1 =v and p 2 being set to either v H or v L , depending on the realization of N i deduced from D 1 . The retailer's the expected profit is
If the retailer sets p 1 =v and commits to p 2 = v H , then his profit will be lower,
The obtained result is in contrast to the Coase conjecture. The main reason is that in the present model learning by the retailer occurs between the two periods, and a pre-order price guarantee has the flexibility to react to this new information that a price commitment does not have.
Finally, we can return to the result at the end of Section 4.3: We showed that if the stockout probability is defined as η = Prob (D 2 > q), then strategy NPG2 may dominate PG1/PG2
and SS. The ability of the retailer to commit to a price schedule only increases the chances of strategy NPG2 being optimal, as it removes the restriction θ <θ. It follows that while (16) is robust to various rationing rules that are used in the definition of the stock-out probability, (17) is not.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper I developed a framework to analyze the profit-maximizing strategy that a seller of a new to-be-released product may adopt. I determined the conditions under which the retailer should implement advance selling and whether he should offer a pre-order price guarantee.
Market size uncertainty, consumer valuation uncertainty, and consumer heterogeneity in terms of experience are central to my model. If, for example, there were no experienced consumers, then the price guarantee policy will lose its value for the retailer. 14 Without uncertainty about the number of inexperienced consumers, advance selling price premiums will never arise in equilibrium.
Comparing the maximum profits that the retailer can get with and without a pre-order price guarantee, I showed that the former is (weakly) higher than the latter. Under the price guarantee policy the retailer becomes more reluctant to cut the price in the regular selling season, as he faces refund obligations. This, in turn, stimulates consumer incentives to pre-order the product.
To test the Coase conjecture, I analyzed the setting in which the retailer commits to a price schedule in the advance selling season. I found that without a pre-order price guarantee, the retailer is (weakly) better off committing to the regular selling price in the advance selling season than not. However, when the retailer can offer a pre-order price guarantee, price commitment becomes an inferior strategy.
It is important to note that the results of the present paper were derived under the assumption that there are no hassle costs to process refunds under the price guarantee policy. Introduction of these costs into the model will decrease the attractiveness of the price guarantee policy, which would affect the retailer's choice of the profit-maximizing strategy.
14 It is straightforward to show that in the absence of experienced consumers the retailer's optimal pricing strategy is to sell the product to all consumers in the advance selling season for p1 =v, which results in the expected profit of (v − c)ni. At the end of the Appendix I analyze what happens at the extremes (i.e., 0%; 100%) of the % of inexperienced consumers in the population.
Here I show that η * (v L ) increases in σ i and decreases in β L . The second result can be shown directly from the expression (11). Indeed, for each realization of D 2 the fraction
and is strictly decreasing for D 2 > q * (v L ), which occurs with positive probability. Hence, the expected value of the fraction,
The latter increases in z β L according to (7) and z β L in turn increases in β L .
The first result -that η * (v L ) increases in σ i -is less obvious. Define
In terms of this function, the stock-out probability can be written as
((1 − θ)n e + n i + σ i z β L ) /y − (1 − θ)n e − n i σ i dy = 1 0Φ z β L y + ((1 − θ)n e + n i ) (1 − y) σ i y dy whereΦ(z) = 1 − Φ(z) is the tail probability of the standard normal distribution. Since for each y ∈ (0, 1) the integrand increases in σ i , so does the integral (η * (v L )).
Derivations of (12) and (13)
The numerator is quadratic with respect to θ. The equation
has two roots, one of which is negative and the other is
Hence, the left-hand side of the above inequality is positive if and only if
Proof of Proposition 1
It is easy to verify that strategy PG1 dominates both NPG2 and SS when θ is sufficiently small.
Indeed, as θ goes to zero, the retailer's payoff approaches
under PG1, and zero under SS.
Next, we show that PG2 dominates SS when θ is sufficiently large. (NPG2 cannot be implemented by the retailer in this case.) Indeed, as θ goes to one, the retailer's payoff approaches (v H − c)(n e + n i ) under PG2 and
It is left to determine the optimal pricing strategy for intermediate values of θ. Below we show that NPG2 can never be optimal. Suppose v L is close to v H . Then strategy NPG2 yields
to the retailer, which is lower than the payoffs under PG1/PG2. If v L is close to c, then strategy
while strategy SS yields
The latter exceeds (v H − c)θn e , as σ i /n i > φ(z β H )/β H (see footnote 11). Hence, the retailer's payoff under strategy SS is higher than under NPG2. Numerical calculations show that for any v L ∈ (s, c) strategy NPG2 yields lower payoff than PG1/PG2 or SS.
Having eliminated NPG2 from the list of potentially optimal strategies, we show that strategy SS can be optimal. Suppose σ i is very small, so the retailer's payoff under SS approaches (v H − c)θ(n e + n i ).
If we take θ =θ and compare SS and PG2 (PG1 yields the same payoff as PG2 in this case), then we will see that SS dominates PG2 if the proportion of experienced consumers in the population is relatively large: (v H − c)θ(n e + n i ) > (v − c)(θn e + n i ),
.
No Experienced Consumers
In the absence of experienced consumers the three pricing policies -NPG, PG, and PC -give rise to the same two pricing strategies:
1. Set p 1 =v and p 2 = v H . All consumers pre-order the product. The retailer's expected It is clear that strategy 1 yields a higher expected profit to the retailer than does strategy 2. Hence, the retailer's optimal pricing strategy in the absence of experienced consumers is to sell the product to all consumers in the advance selling season for p 1 =v. In the presence of experienced consumers, however, the retailer may choose not to implement advance selling.
Proposition 1 implies that spot selling at p 2 = v H is the optimal pricing strategy for intermediate values of θ.
No Inexperienced Consumers
In the absence of inexperienced consumers the retailer can achieve the profit of θ(v H − c)n e by producing θn e and spot selling at p 2 = v H , and the profit of (v L − c)n e by producing n e and spot selling at p 2 = v L . He will choose the former strategy if θ > (v L − c)/(v H − c) and the latter if otherwise. The retailer cannot do better than that by implementing advance selling, irrespective of the pricing policy (NPG, PG, or PC).
